S. HRG. 99-143

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 16, 1985

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

48-991 O WASHINGTON : 1985

S381-25

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, *Chairman*

JESSE HELMS, North Carolina	CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr., Maryland	JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, Kansas	PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
RUDY BOSCHWITZ, Minnesota	EDWARD ZORINSKY, Nebraska
LARRY PRESSLER, South Dakota	ALAN CRANSTON, California
FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, Alaska	CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
PAUL S. TRIBLE, Jr., Virginia	THOMAS F. EAGLETON, Missouri
DANIEL J. EVANS, Washington	JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

JEFFREY T. BERGNER, *Staff Director*
GERYLD B. CHRISTIANSON, *Minority Staff Director*

CONTENTS

	Page
Hearing days:	
April 16, 1985	1
Statement of:	
Kirkpatrick, Jeane J., Ambassador, former U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations	2
Young, Hon. Andrew, former U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations	18

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

TUESDAY, APRIL 16, 1985

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Helms, Kassebaum, Trible, Pell, Cranston, and Dodd.

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order.

The committee will today continue its comprehensive consideration of American foreign policy. This consideration will continue throughout the year as a backdrop to our work on specific items of legislation.

The topic on which we wish to focus today is the proper place of multilateral diplomacy in the conduct of our foreign policy. The United States historically has been a strong supporter of international organizations, and was a prime architect of the U.N. system after the Second World War.

Hopes were high that the United Nations in particular would be a central force for peace. In recent years, however, many have questioned the utility of U.S. participation in international organizations and other multilateral diplomatic efforts.

These questions have been expressed in our withdrawal from Unesco [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization], in various congressional actions limiting or attempting to limit U.S. funding for international organizations, and in a drop in support for the United Nations as measured by public opinion polls.

The question before us therefore is whether and how multilateral diplomacy can today be an effective part of the conduct of our foreign policy. What are its strengths, and what are its limits?

To enlighten us on these issues, we are very pleased to welcome the Honorable Jeane Kirkpatrick and the Honorable Andrew Young. We will begin with Ambassador Kirkpatrick's opening statement, and then ask our questions of her, and then we will proceed to Ambassador Young, and the committee will submit questions to him.

I must say at the outset that we have indeed two extraordinarily talented and stellar witnesses today. I have visited with my distin-

guished colleague, Senator Pell, to make certain that there is ample time, and as far as possible, equal time for both, with the thought that our hearing must conclude by 12:30 p.m. and preferably a few minutes before that today.

I mention that for the guidance of members of the committee and the arrangement of their schedules.

Before I call upon Ambassador Kirkpatrick, I would like to ask Senator Pell for his opening comments.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I truly congratulate you on this series of hearings. I think it is particularly appropriate that we touch on multilateral diplomacy, because this is a whole new field of foreign relations that has really emerged over the past 40 years.

I have been a United Nations afficionado since being in the San Francisco Conference and working there trying to create the great new world that we all look forward to. My boss's boss was Alger Hiss I remember at that time, who took a very hard line vis-a-vis the Soviets.

In any case, in spite of all of the criticism of the United Nations, it would seem to me that the wars it has prevented, the people it has taught to read, the lives it has saved would justify creating another organization if we had not had that one already in being.

In Mrs. Kirkpatrick and Mr. Young we have two truly very energetic and very able witnesses, and this should be a very good hearing.

I ask unanimous consent that the record be kept open so that any of our colleagues who might want to submit written questions or statements could do so.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

Senator Kassebaum, do you have any opening thoughts this morning?

Senator KASSEBAUM. No. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick, would you proceed with your testimony?

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, FORMER U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to begin by congratulating you on the serious discussions of U.S. foreign policy which the Foreign Relations Committee is now holding under your chairmanship.

I believe these discussions are timely and extremely important. I think it is important that we face the fact in our foreign affairs that the world keeps changing, and as the world keeps changing, so do institutions and problems, and obviously the effectiveness of our ability to function in pursuit of our own goals in the world depends on our having a timely and realistic understanding of contemporary contacts and problems.

I believe that these hearings are in fact contributing to that examination by the Congress of contemporary realities and helping to focus attention on these realities by a broader public.

I might also add that I believe the Congress has an extremely important role to play in the conduct of foreign affairs that is not only important but legitimate.

I am persuaded that in the contemporary interdependent world, where interdependence is not just a word or a concept, it is a reality of our everyday lives, which affects our economy, our security, our health, democracy, and popular control of government have meaning only insofar as the instrumentalities of democratic control and popular government are brought to bear on the conduct of our foreign affairs, and I think that the Congress and the other elected bodies, which are, after all, only the President, besides the Congress, have an irreducible and key role to play in this process.

I take it that we could agree about where we are and what our goals are, at least I hope we can. I think we can agree that we stand at the end of one era and that that era could be characterized really as the post-World War II synthesis, so to speak, and that a good many of the understandings and arrangements which have shaped that world have come into question and are being continually brought into question by experiences that have occurred since the key institutions of the post-World War II period were put into place.

That includes some of our alliances. It includes the United Nations and other instrumentalities through which we conduct our foreign affairs.

I might just say that I very much appreciate the committee and you, Senator Lugar, permitting me to participate in these discussions of where we are today and how our institutions today can serve us.

Now, I take it that we seek to achieve several goals through our foreign policy, one instrumentality of which is the United Nations. President Truman said at the time of the founding of the United Nations that it would be henceforth the foundation of our foreign policy.

I think that probably it has not turned out to be the case, but it certainly has been one of the foundations of our foreign policy and an important dimension of it.

I take it that our goals which we seek to achieve through foreign policy may be summarized as the following: Defending our own Nation and its democratic institutions against internal attack or subversion; defending our allies and our civilization against external attack and subversion; preserving the kind of world in which we can live and thrive and enjoy life.

That means, I take it, for us a world of independent nations enjoying self-determination and sovereignty and territorial integrity. Nations with whom we can trade, among whom we can travel, nations which will live with us in peace, and not pursue aggressive expansionist policies.

Another goal of our foreign policy is promoting democratic institutions, human rights, and economic development. That is the language of the U.N. Charter, and those purposes of the United Nations which guided its founding remain to this day among the chief objectives of our foreign policy.

Finally, I take it that a goal of our foreign policy is to manage our foreign relations in such a way that they do not consume an

extraordinary share of our resources or our time or our effort or our money.

The United Nations was established, of course, in the high hopes of the World War II period. That whole period was guided by not only the terrible experience of the Nazi regime and the devastations of war, but it was also guided by a characteristically American approach to foreign affairs.

And one aspect of that American approach to foreign affairs is to view foreign affairs as a problem which can be solved, as it were, sort of a for once and for all affair, rather than to view particular situations, opportunities, problems as events in an ongoing process that has to be managed.

Let me be specific. Our approach to Yalta at the end of World War II was, above all, a consequence of seeing the arrangements at the end of World War II as a kind of all-time solution to the problem that World War II had solved.

We expected, I think, that the future in international relations was going to be qualitatively different than the past. We expected that nations would subordinate the desire for power, power over each other and expansion, to the desire for peace, and we expected that therefore they would be willing to use instrumentalities of peace like reason and negotiation, discussion and debate, rather than instrumentalities of war.

We thought that the international relations of the postwar period could be managed by the United Nations and its processes for just the reason that the relations among nations would be qualitatively different than they ever had been.

Now, I think that we clearly were mistaken in our expectations that nations everywhere would subordinate power and power goals like expansion to the preservation of peace, and we clearly were mistaken in our expectation that nations would be willing to renounce the use of violence in the pursuit of their national objectives and to give priority to the goals of the U.N. Charter.

Why is it necessary to say we were clearly mistaken? Well, it is necessary because clearly there have been repeated, many, multiple wars in the postwar period since the United Nations existed, and those multiple wars have not, of course, largely involved major nations, although we have ourselves been involved in two limited wars since the end of World War II.

Most of the wars and violent conflicts since the end of World War II have involved, of course, Third World nations pursuing their goals in relationship to each other by means of violence, and it is sometimes estimated that there have been some 42 wars in the period since World War II, 42 separate conflicts, most of those between Third World nations, and that something over 40 million persons have been killed in these small wars conducted, one might note, by very conventional instruments of violence.

So, obviously, every one of those wars constitutes a kind of irreducible evidence of the unwillingness of a great many countries in a great many circumstances to subordinate power goals to the pursuit of goals, their goals by peaceful means, negotiation and compromise and adjudication and the instrumentalities of peace provided by the United Nations.

Now, one might decide because keeping the peace was at the very center of our conception of what the United Nations might do, we might decide that because it has not succeeded in that, it is in fact a failure, and certainly it is a failure with regard to the achievement of this central goal.

My good friend, the distinguished former foreign minister of the Philippines, General Carlos Romulo, who is the only living signatory of the U.N. Charter, often says of the United Nations that in evaluating it we should think not of one but of two United Nations, and that we should distinguish in our thinking between the United Nations of the independent agencies and the United Nations which is sort of the central core political instrumentalities of the United Nations.

The United Nations of the independent agencies is, of course, the United Nations of the High Commission on Refugees [UNHCR], of UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund], of the World Health Organization [WHO], of Unesco, of the International Telecommunications Union [ITU], the World Meteorological Organization [WMO], and so forth and so forth.

It is, in short, the United Nations of the humanitarian and scientific agencies, and most of those organizations would be considered successful by standards of international cooperation which we would normally judge an enterprise by, or by standards of relevance to American goals in the world, because among our goals certainly are the enhancement of the quality of life, health, and well-being development for other nations.

Those independent agencies, particularly the ones which I have named but not exclusively those, I think, have made a demonstrable contribution to the achievement of those goals for which they were established and which are also goals, continuing, enduring goals of American foreign policy.

The core political agencies of the United Nations, the Security Council, the General Assembly, which were the agencies principally relied upon to secure peaceful settlement of international disputes and also to serve as a kind of parliament to the world, have surely functioned less effectively than the independent agencies.

I think it is impossible to say that they have been successful. It is those bodies about which it is necessary to say that they frequently fail in the accomplishment of their objectives or in the accomplishment of our objectives in foreign affairs. The reasons for that failure I think are multiple, and they are often oversimplified.

I would like to touch on one that I think is frequently grasped as an explanation of the relative political failure of the political bodies and explain why I think it is mistaken.

That is the notion that these bodies fail because they are dominated by superpower rivalry, so to speak, and because they are paralyzed by the disagreements between the Soviet Union and the United States, and the implication there is that if they do not work, it is our fault.

That is, it is the fault of the United States and Soviet Union at least, and our inability to settle our own disputes or also that they could not work if there were not peace among sort of all the principal nations, peace and understanding and harmony among the major nations in the world, because we need to also be clear that

there has not been war between the United States and Soviet Union in this postwar period that we are discussing.

There have been wars among a lot of nations, but there has never been war between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

The fact is that most of the agenda in the United Nations and most of the decisions are not dominated by superpower rivalry. They are not dominated by either the United States or the Soviet Union. Most of the agenda, most of the decisions are a direct consequence of the politics of the Third World nations.

Most of the disputes occur between Third World nations, and their outcome is settled by the relations among other Third World nations. Let me give you some examples. The most dramatic example at the moment, of course, is the Iran-Iraq war. The Iran-Iraq war is simply not a function of superpower rivalry.

Now, I would not want to say that it is irrelevant to superpower rivalry, though I would say that superpower rivalry is almost irrelevant to it. Its roots are not in rivalries or disagreements between the United States and the U.S.S.R. and its dynamic does not lie in any relations between us and the Soviet Union.

Its roots, of course, if you talk to people in the area, are in age-old hostilities between the non-Arab Moslems, the Persians, if you will, and the Arabs. The war is terribly important. We all understand that.

Its repercussions may be worldwide. But its causes and its dynamic and its end finally, I think, are rooted in those hostilities of the region, and specifically between those two countries, those two governments, those two rulers.

The U.N. Security Council and the General Assembly have not been able to make a very significant contribution to the resolution of that terribly destructive and murderous conflict in which children are sent into battle unarmed to be used as mine detectors and in which chemical weapons are used against civilian populations. It is a terrible war.

In the Security Council, we have from time to time attempted to consider what we might do that is useful to help contain or ameliorate or resolve that conflict. The Secretary General has, of course, just in the past week been on a factfinding mission to explore the possibilities for U.N. action of a constructive sort to try to win that conflict.

What happens when we have tried to deal with it is that the politics of that age-old conflict comes into being, dominates the negotiations and considerations of decisions of the Security Council, and largely prevents any kind of effective action.

There are partisans in the United Nations of Iraq, a good many partisans of Iraq who are associated by history and culture and geography with the cause of Iraq.

And there are, incredibly enough, partisans of Iran in the United Nations as well who believe for one reason or another that the Iranians should not have a solution imposed on them even by the Security Council, even a verbal solution, so to speak.

And the desire to achieve a consensus outcome or to achieve recommendations which are acceptable to both parties ends by essentially paralyzing the Security Council with relationship to the Iran-Iraq war.

It has been considered three or four times now in a rather long process by the Security Council. Each time the outcome has been, even at the verbal level, extremely inconclusive.

Were there to be a recommendation adopted by the Security Council for the end of the war that might conceivably be a practical solution, the Security Council would also, of course, have no means to enforce its implementation.

That means two things: One, that the decision process is effectively paralyzed, and two, that even if it were not, it is very unlikely that any very constructive solution would result from Security Council consideration of that war.

There are many other examples of Third World conflicts which have been before the Security Council in the last 3 years, which the Council has proved unable to deal with effectively.

The Libyan invasion of Chad is an example. The Foreign Minister of Chad repeatedly came at the time of the invasion, at the time of the occupation, and most recently at the time of the terrorist plot against the Chadian Government which was mounted by the Libyan Government, there is a lot of evidence to that effect.

And in each case the Chadian complaint has been answered within the Security Council by a discussion, a rather incomplete discussion, and by some kind of nonconclusion. In most cases there has not even been a resolution calling on the Libyans to evacuate Chad or to respect Chad's territorial integrity.

Similarly, in the two Libyan incursions into the Sudan, there have been complaints brought by the Government of Sudan, I guess I should say now the previous Government of Sudan, and each of those complaints has resulted in some discussion and no action by the Security Council.

Why? Because the bloc politics of the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly is such that Libya is effectively protected against any sort of decision by the Council that would be embarrassing to it, including, let us say, a resolution demanding the withdrawal of Libya from Chad or a resolution even deploring or condemning the efforts at destabilizing a neighboring government or declining to respect its territorial integrity, or, for that matter, undertaking terrorist action against a neighboring government. No decision is possible because Libya's protectors are sufficiently strong in the bloc system that they can prevent such action, and do.

It is very difficult to get Security Council action on a subject on which there is not broad agreement within the blocs in the United Nations.

It is usually possible to get a consensus, a very broad consensus, excluding only us, on any resolution condemning Israel. There is a heavy majority available to condemn Israel for almost anything at almost any time. I might say that this occurs regardless of the policy of the Government of Israel.

It was as true in January 1981 as it is true in May or will be true in May 1985, as it was true in March 1985, when the last complaint with which I was involved was dealt with.

There are superpower rivalries which, from time to time, do, in fact, clearly impinge on Security Council behavior, and I think these are clear, for example, in Lebanon and in our policies on Leb-

anon, where the Soviet Union has consistently supported Syria and Syria's territorial objectives, and the United States has consistently declined at least to join in a condemnation of Israel for most things under most circumstances.

The Soviets' attitude toward peacekeeping has prevented the expansion of the use of peacekeeping forces in Lebanon. I would like to say, to be very clear, because there is a lot of misunderstanding about this in the world, that the Reagan adminstration sought repeatedly and consistently to expand the role of U.N. peacekeeping forces and U.N. observers in the Lebanese conflict.

In fact, it was only after we were certain that the jurisdiction of the U.N. peacekeeping forces could not be extended that we moved to cooperating with the British, the French, and the Italians in organizing the multinational force for Lebanon.

And that is a good example of how U.N. decisions or lack of decisions can affect our policy. It created the context in which we had to act there. The blocking of an enhanced role for U.N. observers and U.N. peacekeeping forces, which blockage began at the beginning of the conflict and continues to this day, has meant that the United Nations could only play a somewhat marginal role to contemporary conflicts, and that clearly has been a Soviet decision, not anybody else's decision.

It is supported by the bloc system at the United Nations, but it is not finally rooted there. It is rooted in the Soviet veto power and their willingness to use their veto if necessary to expand the jurisdiction of the U.N. observers and troops in Lebanon.

That was made clearest of all when the Soviets did finally veto a resolution that would have provided a very slightly expanded U.N. peacekeeping role in Lebanon. What can we do about this? Well, I might say first that another example of a Soviet direct role is with regard to U.N. action on terrorism.

Efforts to secure Security Council condemnations of terrorist activities, even terrorist activities against diplomats, invariably fail. I have frequently thought that if there is an issue on which it ought to be possible for the diplomats of the world to unite, it is on the proposition that diplomats should not be the object of violence, but we cannot get agreement in the Security Council on the proposition that diplomats ought not to be the object of violence.

The Soviets have been repeatedly unwilling to join with the rest of us on this kind of endorsement of antiterrorist principles.

Now, where does this leave us all? There are a lot of other problems, of course, associated with U.N. operation, but I believe that the most serious problem associated with the operations of multilateral diplomacy today for us are the incapacities of the United Nations with regard to the accomplishment of its central purpose, which is peaceable resolution of disputes.

I think that that failure is rooted above all in the existence of a good many nations who are more interested in some other goal than they are interested in the preservation of peace. I think a very good example is indeed to be found in Lebanon, where one can see that the Syrians repeatedly have been more interested in establishing and maintaining Syrian hegemony than they have been interested in bringing a peaceable solution or creating a sovereign,

independent Lebanon whose territory would be respected by a'' parties.

One might wish that countries were always ready to subordinate international objectives to international humanitarian goals, but the fact is most countries are not. The veto, of course, protects the five permanent members in those matters which they consider their most vital national interests.

During my years in the United Nations, I, of course, used the veto rather often in the first 2 years, and very rarely in the last 2 years, as our political strength improved, but during that period the Soviets used the veto on two occasions, the British used the veto.

The Soviets used the veto with regard to the Korean airliner, and the British used the veto with regard to the Falklands resolution, you will recall. And the French used the veto on one occasion, the Chinese on one occasion.

The veto is not necessarily used in behalf of one's own national interest narrowly conceived. As I understand it, of the five countries, only the United States and the Soviet Union use the veto in the protection of something other than their own direct, vital national interests narrowly conceived.

I have been told by British and French colleagues that their countries have a policy of using the veto only in those very narrow circumstances. We do use the veto generally when we use it not in protection of our own national interests narrowly conceived, but someone else's or for some principle.

So does the Soviet Union, and so, by the way, does China. There must be some mechanisms, though, for the protection of vital national interests in the United Nations, because there is a very tough game of politics played in the United Nations.

Perhaps the most dramatic contrast between our expectations about the United Nations and the realities in the Security Council and General Assembly concerns this game of politics that is played there.

You know, I do not know why it should have come as a surprise to us Americans that the United Nations did not turn out to function like a great global town meeting, because after all town meetings themselves did not function like our ideal conception of a town meeting.

Town meetings themselves, even on village greens, were very often hotly contested, highly political affairs in which political considerations remote from the merits of the case at hand might finally play a large role, as indeed they sometimes do in the Congress of the United States itself.

The fact is, the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council alike function more like legislative bodies than like great international courts. The International Court functions rather more like a legislative body when it deals with political issues than it functions like a court, as we conceive judicial functioning.

What can we do about that? One thing we should not do in my opinion is withdraw from the United Nations. I think the United Nations is terribly important to most of the nations in the world. It is terribly important to them because they think it is terribly important to them.

It would be a terrible blow to most of the nations in the world if the United States were to withdraw from the United Nations or withhold cooperation.

What I believe we should do is face as realistically as we can what kind of processes we are dealing with in the United Nations, and to be as effective as we can in serving our values and interests there, and I do believe that our values and those of the democracies turn out to be identical with the values of the charter and the goals of the charter.

I think we need to be ever alert to the corruption of the independent agencies by the political processes, the politics of the General Assembly, and the political bodies. That process of politicization has been, I think, quite far advanced.

I think we have set it back now some. I think we need also to be very careful to guard those bodies against the kind of stagnation that comes with bureaucratization of outrageous proportions. Just as problems become more complex when they are international, so do bureaucracies become more complex and larger often when they are international.

In the case of Unesco, I think both bureaucratization and politicization played their role in rendering that institution less capable of functioning to pursue its own goals in its own charter.

I think we need to distinguish between U.N. bodies and activities which are constructive and which do contribute to the goals of American foreign policy and work toward the goals of the charter and those which are destructive simply and wasteful and stagnant and paralyze.

And I think it is very important to distinguish in our contributions between those bodies that are effectively managed toward the achievement of constructive goals of the charter and those that are ineffectively managed and wastefully run, and often serve very negative goals.

I think we need to work continually toward tighter administration and economy in the United Nations. The U.N. charter provides an absolute recipe for fiscal irresponsibility because the countries who have the votes do not pay the bills, and the countries who pay the bills do not have the votes.

So, a majority in the United Nations can vote an increase in budget and suffer no increase, no substantive penalty to themselves because their own share of the budget is so low that it is effectively unaffected by increases in the budget.

We work with all the permanent members, particularly the British, the French, and the Soviets, on trying to bring the budget under some control, and that is an area, by the way, in which there is consistent United States-Soviet cooperation in the United Nations.

I think we need to be as realistic about the politics of the United Nations as we are about politics in our own country, and that is pretty realistic, and we need to be aware that in refusing to participate in the politics of the United Nations we are not being idealistic in advancing the goals of the charter. We are simply being naive and contributing to the destruction of the United Nations.

There are my views in a nutshell, and I thank you for your patience.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador Kirkpatrick.

In order to make certain that we have equity of time for both witnesses today, the Chair will suggest that we limit our questions to 5 minutes in this round.

I will pass for the moment, and recognize Senator Helms for questions.

Senator HELMS. I would be glad to defer to Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you. Please go ahead.

Senator HELMS. Thank you.

Madam Ambassador, let me get a little more mundane. I hear from time tc time in this Congress that maybe we ought to rotate the location of the United Nations and let the people who align themselves with the Soviet Union see how it is in the Soviet Union, maybe Peking or other places.

How would you react to that?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator, I would say that I have on more than one occasion said that I think in an ideal world the United Nations should meet half the time in Moscow and half the time in New York, maybe alternate sessions, maybe alternate years, because there is a good deal of discussion of there being two great approaches to life, and two great world systems. I do think it might be useful, in fact, for everyone to have the opportunity of experiencing both systems.

I also think in some resentful moments dealing with certain kinds of problems in New York that I thought I would be happy to share those problems with the Soviets, certain kinds of security problems, not just involving the Soviets, by the way, but involving all the countries of the world in which we, from time to time, are rather harshly criticized as host country, and I rather wish that some other nation got an opportunity to take a turn at dealing with these problems.

Generally speaking, I think we do very well in our host country operations.

Finally, I would say that I believe the United States suffers certain real problems as a consequence of having the United Nations permanently located in New York. Above all, espionage.

I think loss of parking places and the presence of espionage are the two most negative consequences of the location of the United Nations in New York.

I do believe that we enjoy a good many benefits from that location in New York as well, and among those certainly are an opportunity for New Yorkers to be exposed to literally all the peoples of the world, and it enhances our cosmopolitanism and the cultural resources at our disposal.

Senator HELMS. My followup question was going to relate to espionage. Some time back I asked Judge Webster of the FBI to give me a report on some figures that I had heard. I do not have his correspondence before me, but he said, in effect, that the United Nations is a hotbed of espionage.

Now, is that still the case?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Well, let me say that I am not an expert on this subject. I have tried to cooperate with our Government agencies who are charged with dealing with these problems,

including the FBI. My understanding is that there is indeed a great deal of espionage based at the United Nations.

There are two kinds. One, agents who simply seek to influence the United Nations itself, and agents who use the immunities available to them through the United Nations to gather information surreptitiously and illegally in the United States and about the United States and/or to participate in our politics and/or to deal with illegal groups in this country.

I might add that we do have—the Congress has provided the Government a new tool for dealing with this problem through the Foreign Missions Act, and I believe that the provisions of the Foreign Missions Act, carefully implemented and enforced, could substantially reduce the vulnerability of the United States to espionage based in the United Nations.

I might say that is also the opinion of Mr. Webster and other members of the FBI which they have communicated to me. And I might add that I personally worked quite hard to try to secure the full implementation of the Foreign Missions Act.

Senator HELMS. But then you are into diplomatic immunity and all sorts of complications are involved in that, and the implementation. I see that my time is up. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Helms.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

From a positive viewpoint, what parts of the United Nations do you see being most effective and what recommendations might you have for improving the effectiveness of the United Nations?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. As I said in my testimony, scientific and humanitarian organizations tend to be generally quite effective.

For example, the World Health Organization has made fantastic contributions to world health, which is exactly what it should have done, in the elimination of smallpox and tuberculosis and a variety of childhood ailments.

I think they have done yeoman's work. I think that Unicef, particularly in its development and focus on childhood nutrition, health, and infant mortality makes major contributions.

I think the High Commission on Refugees operation, which provides sustenance for some 14 million refugees who are victims of the violent politics of our age, does a marvelous job.

The United Nations Development Program does a good job in coordinating the various development efforts. I am told I know less personally about the scientific agencies, but I am told by people who do know about them that the World Meteorological Organization and the International Telecommunications Union and the Organization on Intellectual Property, which deals with copyrights and so forth, do first class jobs internationally of achieving their goals.

Now, in each case, in each of those organizations, we see effective management and determined opposition to politicization, and control over the process of bureaucratization.

Bureaucracies tend to grow, whether they are in private corporations, in governments, or in international bodies, and so it takes a

lot of vigilance and determination to try to prevent the simple proliferation of bureaucracy.

I believe that in the case of Unesco, clearly one of the sources of the problem was the kind of uncontrolled process of bureaucratization. It finally ended by creating a situation in which some 85 percent of the total budget was expended in Paris on the organization itself, which is really quite shocking.

But in the organizations I mentioned, there is effective management and real dedication to preventing this kind of bureaucratization.

Senator PELL. Thank you. Forty years ago, when I was working in San Francisco on articles 3, 4, and 5 of the charter, we were trying to create an organization that would remedy the faults of the League of Nations. The rule of thumb then was that anything the League did we almost sought to make a 180° turnabout on.

One of the things we were most concerned about in these three articles was the military staff committee and enforcement arrangements. I wonder if you see any possibility of developing that form of international force which has so far been blocked by the veto, any possibility of developing that force?

In this regard, do you see the possibility of developing an international sea guard along the lines based on the Coast Guard, a subject we have discussed?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Yes, which we have discussed, Senator Pell. Frankly, I do not, because I think the opposition to it today would simply be overwhelming, and that it would be blocked by veto. I have already mentioned that the Soviet Union has really consistent and apparently implacable hostility to the expansion of peacekeeping functions of the United Nations.

As I am sure you know, they do not contribute any funding to peacekeeping operations, which means that they are continually deeply in arrears in their budget contributions. They also do not vote for peackeeping resolutions.

For example, they abstained on the UNIFIL mandates, and they made clear as in the Lebanon veto that if necessary they will use the veto to block any expansion of U.N. peacekeeping functions.

Senator PELL. But at some point you have to have a U.N. peacekeeping presence. We have had that in the past. How do you see that moving?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. We feel that the U.N. observer forces, for example, have in the Middle East served very constructive functions, and we strongly support the existence and development of strong U.N. observer forces.

We have hoped, as, for example, in Beirut, that even where the Soviets might not be willing to accept peacekeeping troops, that they would be willing to accept observer forces.

Unfortunately, they also oppose observer forces, and I think the reason, Senator Pell, is that they are not a status quo power. They are usually seeking to change governments at borders, relationships, and seek to do that in an unimpeded fashion.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, I think you will remember that about 2 years ago we passed in the Senate legislation which would lower the U.S. contribution. It was a disappointment to me at that time that the administration did not support that effort, although I can understand the reasoning.

You spoke of the stagnation and the bureaucracy and how this can be better managed. It was my argument at the time that the reduced funding would force the United Nations to establish their priorities in management.

How do you feel we in the Congress can have a role to play, and is there a budgetary role in forcing better management?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator Kassebaum, the whole question of withholding is hotly debated within our Government as well as within the United Nations. Now, I believe that it is not only legally permissible but appropriate, frankly, for the United States to withhold contributions to our assessed budget in those cases, that the programs are not mandated by the charter or consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

The Congress has, of course, acted on several occasions to mandate withholding where the Congress judged programs not to be consistent with either our Constitution or the Charter of the United Nations.

Outstanding examples of that are programs whose principal benefit is to the PLO or SWAPO or the withholding in the case of the Law of the Sea Treaty implementation, where there is implementation of a treaty, one, to which we are not signatories, and two, some of whose provisions we regard as incompatible with our Constitution, and three, whose expenses we think are not a legitimate item for the U.N. Secretariat, but whose expenses should be dealt with by the members of the Treaty Organization, that is, those countries who are signatories to the treaty under the treaty establishing an organization which assumes the expenses and the responsibility for the implementation of the Law of the Sea Treaty. We think that is not a legitimate expense.

Now, former Permanent Representative Arthur Goldberg, and former Supreme Court Representative and Professor of International Law Arthur Goldberg enunciated at the time that he was permanent representative, something he called the Goldberg reservation on U.S. contributions to the United Nations which he argued that as long as other nations were in arrears in their assessed contributions to the United Nations and suffered no penalties as provided by the charter for that arrearage, the United States would reserve the right to withhold contributions as well, when those contributions were judged by our Government to be inconsistent with our values and interests.

It is the Goldberg reservation that we have invoked in explaining our withholding in the case of the PLO, SWAPO, and the Law of the Sea, PREPCOM. You understand that more than half our direct contributions to the United Nations are to the independent agencies. They are not through the assessed budget.

So, that much of the budget is under the control and decision of the Congress annually in its annual appropriations.

I believe that our purposes in the United Nations would be best served by focusing our economy efforts on discriminating between

the efficient and well-managed and constructive organizations and those which were the reverse, and being generous with the one, and making real cuts on the second category.

I think that will enhance the effectiveness of U.N. agencies, not diminish it.

Second, I believe that the Congress could achieve its purposes of making the U.N. Secretariat more budget conscious by trying to, one, discriminate, two, support the politics of the U.S. mission.

What I mean by that is that the Congress is in a position to help the U.S. Representative and the U.S. mission persuade other countries to behave more responsibly with regard to many issues, including the budget. It is not the Secretariat, you see.

That is our problem, where we have a problem, even with bureaucratization, it is the policy decisions made by the member states, so it is those member states' decisions that we need to influence, and I think we can do that through our bilateral relations most effectively. That is my personal position and view.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

I see that my time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kassebaum.

I would like to continue the line of thought that Senator Kassebaum initiated. I am intrigued by the thought of support by the Congress of the U.S. mission. One of the problems that I perceive is that there has not been as strong a tie between this committee, to say nothing about the rest of the Congress and the U.S. mission as there might have been.

There may have been a failure on both sides in a sense. But in order to have this fine tuning of activity, we would need to have a better perception here of what is occurring at the United Nations, and specifically tailor our foreign assistance requests or our resolutions or whatever else we do in that manner.

From your experience as ambassador, can you give us some guidance in terms of our own procedures for how we should try to make these discriminations on the basis of agencies as well as bilateral relations?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Well, Senator Lugar, I would say that in my experience, the Congress has played an enormously important, I would say, even vital role in supporting the activities of the U.S. mission, and I would beyond that say that our ability to enhance our influence and position in the United Nations has been very importantly contributed to by the Congress.

I think that is done by continuing contact between the U.S. Permanent Representative and the Congress. I would like to say that I believe it is important for the Members of the Congress through the committees to secure testimony and accounting and reports from the U.S. Permanent Representative, and I do not believe that is adequately available to the Congress simply through the State Department. I would like to explain why.

The State Department has as its principal objective and preoccupation in the world bilateral relations inevitably. It is because our most important objectives are probably to this day achieved bilaterally and through our bilateral relations and through our regional treaty relations like NATO and so forth, and not through multilateral diplomacy.

The multilateral diplomacy is very different than bilateral diplomacy. It is very much more like a legislature and legislative politics than it is like bilateral diplomacy.

I think there is a tendency, entirely understandable and probably inevitable, for the particular perspectives and needs of U.S. representation in the United Nations and in multilateral arenas generally to get lost in comparison with bilateral diplomacy, and it can only be offset by direct contact between the Congress and the U.S. Representatives in the multilateral agencies of which the United Nations is the principal one.

So I would urge continuing contact between the Congress, this committee, and others and the U.S. permanent Representative.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, specifically, when Senator Kassebaum presented her amendment a couple of years ago, would a better form of this amendment, as it turns out, to have been one that specified the dues that we would pay to specific organizations with withholding from others so that the sum total came out at or below where we were before.

Should we attempt, in other words, to carve this degree of specificity into it?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I think that is entirely appropriate for the Congress to do. There has been a tendency in our budgeting in multilateral agencies, I suppose, as well as domestic ones, simply to make across-the-board budgetary policy, and above all, to give across-the-board budgetary increases year after year.

There is an entirely understandable human tendency to seek to emphasize the constructive and not to be negatively critical of anybody, what that results in is awarding ineffective performance equally with effective performance, and waste effectively with economy, and constructive agencies equally with destructive agencies.

And so it penalizes the agencies that are ready to try sound fiscal management. I think the Congress should discriminate. I think the Congress should take an interest in the management and output of the various agencies and discriminate.

I believe if the Congress did this then the result would be an enhanced performance on the part of most of the agencies and maybe the disappearance of the agencies that have become real international bureaucratic boondoggles, and there are a few of those.

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, we are deeply indebted to you for your testimony. We are grateful for the service you have given our country. The committee looks forward to seeing you on many occasions in the future.

Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. I have one more brief question.

I do not expect you to know the details of the subversion at the United Nations, but do you know whether there is a classified or confidential report by either the CIA or the FBI or both relating to this.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Yes, Senator Helms, I have personal knowledge of that subject.

Senator HELMS. All right. I imagined that there might be. I think we might well have a hearing on that, Mr. Chairman. I think it is

of great importance to the American people. I went to the office just now to find precisely what Judge Webster said to me.

He said Soviet and Soviet bloc intelligence personnel are assigned to the United States using a variety of covers. It has been our experience that virtually all of their diplomatic and ancillary commercial establishments provide cover slots for their intelligence personnel.

Their intelligence officers and agents may also gain admission to the United States on a temporary basis in a commercial or cultural capacity or even as tourists.

Mr. Chairman, I brought this up not in a frivolous way, because my understanding is that it is an enormous problem in terms of security of this country.

I join the chairman in thanking you for appearing this morning.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, Senator Helms.

May I comment very briefly on that, please?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. The most outrageous example I know today of Soviet espionage and improper influence in the U.N. Secretariat is in the case of the information service called PINS, which is a world information clipping service. It is run, produced, and distributed within the Secretariat.

It is done formally under the auspices of Soviet Under Secretary for Political Affairs Ustinov. It is generally believed inside the United Nations by people who know that it is carried out in fact by a KGB agent who is one Victor Andreyev, who is a special assistant to Mr. Ustinov.

This has been published in the New York papers. The news service, so-called, which is distributed throughout the Secretariat, is highly biased and tendentious. Day after day we have protested repeatedly about this. The President himself raised this question with the Secretary General. I regret to say the news service has continued to function.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Just briefly, let me ask this, because this interests me as much as the cost. In my recollection of United Nations history, the peacekeeping role of the forces put together by the United Nations have on the whole been fairly successful, would you not say?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Right. Yes, I would say that.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Do you see an expanded role in this area for the United Nations, and specifically, would you ever see it being something used in Central America?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator Kassebaum, I would say what I said to Senator Pell. The Soviets have regularly opposed the use of U.N. peacekeeping forces. They declined to vote on peacekeeping resolutions. They declined to contribute to peacekeeping forces and the costs of peacekeeping forces, including observers.

I frankly therefore do not foresee any expansion of these.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But we have gone ahead with it despite their objections, of course.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. But those peacekeeping forces were established at a time when the West was relatively stronger inside the United Nations and the Soviet bloc was relatively weaker.

Today I do not think it would be possible to get the authorization of new peacekeeping forces and implementation of it by the Secretariat in any case that the Soviets actively opposed. Nothing happens that the Soviets actively oppose in the United Nations. That is just a fact.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador Kirkpatrick.

The Chair would like to call forward now the Honorable Andrew Young for his testimony.

Ambassador Young, we are deeply honored that you have come today. We have a great deal of admiration as a committee and individually for your public service in so many capacities.

I have personal admiration for your current service as mayor of the great city of Atlanta and the vigor that you have brought to that responsibility, which has continued your international responsibilities in a different capacity.

We welcome you here today, and are prepared to listen to your testimony, and would like to ask questions of you following the testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW YOUNG, FORMER U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Ambassador YOUNG. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Kassebaum, it really gives me a great deal of pleasure to state very briefly some of the things that I have come to feel about the United Nations. I would say that I see the United Nations as essentially a U.S. creation.

It was our idea, our ideals. We created it with a vision that the world needed some order, and that that order needed to be provided in a nonmilitary permanent manner.

I think the United Nations has essentially functioned to give the framework to that order. If we look at that period around which the United Nations was framed, we also had during that period the World Bank. We had agreements at Bretton Woods which stabilized currencies, low interest rates, and provided international opportunities for development.

And for a period of 20 years or so I think that American domination or running of the United Nations was virtually unchallenged. I think the United Nations was a victim of our success and not of our failures in the sense that the 49 or 50 nations that formed the United Nations have now multiplied to about 158 according to the last count that I had, and it may be even more than that now.

With the coming in of those new nations, most of whom came in without violence through a rather peaceful process that in part came out of the United Nations itself, the veto that we helped to create, to give us the security to protect our interests against the overpowering of other nations essentially became an object of envy of the other nations of the world.

And what the nonpermanent members have done to counter the veto of the permanent members is essentially function in blocs. They will essentially vote in blocs. They will meet long before the subjects come up in the United Nations. And the African bloc will meet, and the Arab bloc will meet, the Latin American bloc, the

Asian bloc, and it almost does not matter what the issue is, they vote as blocs.

I found that it was possible to have an influence in the United Nations only if I could get to those blocs. Well, to get to those blocs you had to have a U.S. position fairly early, and normally we are in a reactive period, because every decision that comes to the U.S. Ambassador has some 17 different clearances from the State Department.

By the time we get through that process and the White House, the U.N. politics has run its own way. So, I would like to jump to my recommendations about some of that, because I think our problems there are that as politicians, we have neglected to take seriously the political battles of the United Nations.

Now that these blocs are functioning, it is important, I think, for us to have some access to them, and I have found that almost without exception if I knew what the U.S. Government position was early enough, I could go to the decisionmakers in the blocs with that position. The blocs do not function necessarily democratically, they function almost like a kind of meritocracy or seniority system.

The diplomat from Africa who has been there the longest, who is the brightest, who works the hardest usually ends up being the person who helps to formulate the opinions of that bloc.

The same thing is true of the person from the Arab world or the person from the European nations. The one difference is that the developed nations of the world, almost all of us, tend to rotate our ambassadors quite frequently.

We rotate our diplomats quite frequently, and so we are always the new guys on the block, whereas the Russian ambassadors stay there, and their staffs are there year in and year out.

In certain key Third World nations, they are there 15, 16 years. So the seniority of any political body, the seniority that is built up just over getting to know people personally and getting to know what the politics of the individual branches of the United Nations happen to be, we almost always happen to be on the short end of that kind of decisionmaking process.

I would like to see us continue to run the United Nations, and I think that is possible. I think it would require, though, our looking very seriously at the United Nations as one of the important agencies of U.S. foreign policy.

I suggest that the President of the United States should entertain the Secretary General of the United Nations annually in a state level visit to explain to the Secretary General and to his representative in the Secretariat whatever U.S. foreign policy interests and concerns are, and to get some relationship established with the U.N. Secretariat because it does have a significant amount of power if we are using it.

I think also that if there is an area where we should be thinking of bipartisan foreign policy, and this is something that we talk about all the time, that maybe the United Nations is one of those places, and while one U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations gets most of the attention, there are actually five U.S. Ambassadors, and there is no reason why the other four could not be relatively permanent and bipartisan.

Finally, I think, along those lines, we have to take the bureaucracy of the United Nations seriously. I agree with Ambassador Kirkpatrick that the specialized agencies are really where the real power of the United Nations happens to be.

On the day-to-day administrative power, I think it is a mistake to try to withhold funds because I think our contribution is one of the things that allows us to have the influence to keep key people in the decisionmaking positions. Very few agencies are run by the titular heads.

They are run by the people within that agency who stay there, who know how it works, and who make it work. I would say that that would be true of most American political institutions. It is probably even more true of international political institutions.

Just the language facility, the complications of the politics of dealing with 158 nations is so difficult that it takes time for people to develop the skill and experience to handle those kinds of agencies administratively.

In much of the Third World, or in the Soviet Union, you do not have people with previous experience in managing large bureaucracies, and so any American with experience in management and with an understanding of how bureaucracies work could almost always run a bureaucracy if that was their assignment.

But normally our State Department Ambassadors look at U.N. appointments as a short term in Paris, or Rome, or New York. It is conceived of as a political plum, and nobody gets to keep it too long. And so our involvement in the U.N. specialized agencies tends not to be as effective as it could be and should be.

I view the political process of the General Assembly and the Security Council as being very important to U.S. foreign policy interests in quite different reasons. The General Assembly I view almost like a political psychiatric forum, but I think that is sort of what legislative bodies are anyway.

Not the Senate—excuse me—of course, but certainly my experience in the House and my own city council I feel that way about most of the time. [Laughter.]

What you find is, if you look back over the things that people were raising a fuss about 10 years ago in the United Nations, those are the things that will be in the Security Council today as major problems, and by looking at the things that people are fussing about in the U.N. General Assembly today, I think you can almost anticipate where the tension points are going to be in the world in the coming decade.

And so I used to watch the U.N. General Assembly very closely, though it is very hard to sit through all the speeches, and you know exactly what everybody is going to say. Every now and then something new comes on the horizon and makes you say, uh oh, we had better take a close look at this. This could be trouble for us down the road.

So, I think that is the way I would look at our General Assembly involvement. In the Security Council, once we learned that that Security Council functions as a group of blocs, and that everybody in the Security Council has the veto, and not just the five permanent members, we then have to devise a strategy for relating to those blocs that make up the membership of the Security Council.

In our experience with UNIFIL, for instance, that was the first U.N. resolution that had gone through sponsored by the United States that was not vetoed by the Soviet Union since the Korean resolution in 1950 where they walked out.

We were able to do that largely because we got to the Arab bloc and the African bloc, and essentially everybody in the equation began to let the Soviet representatives know that this was something that they wanted. And in order to do that, you have to take the time to sell the American point of view in advance.

That is another thing that I would say there needs to be. While I would go to meet the Secretariat on numbers of occasions, almost weekly, I had some contact with the Secretary General's office.

But a formal communication from the Secretary of State at least once a month, delivered by the U.S. Ambassador to the Secretary General kind of keeps that whole Secretariat aware that the United States at the highest levels is watching what is going on and is very deeply involved in what is going on, and also it lets people know what our positions are.

I think most of the world really knows, but they will not admit it, that nothing really good happens in the world, certainly not in the United Nations, without the leadership of the United States.

When they get terribly hostile and frustrated with us is when they feel we are not giving that leadership. Most of the ambassadors that I worked with during the term that I was there in almost every mission, including the Chinese mission and the Soviet mission, the ambassadors were educated in the United States.

The Soviet Ambassador went to Sidwell Friends School here in Washington and to Swarthmore College. They know U.S. politics very well. Whether they can admit it or not, they share in the American idealism, though they cannot often represent it in their governments.

But when we are able to carve out a clear and just U.S. position on almost anything in the world, we can get that position seriously considered and more often than not implemented at the United Nations.

So, I would just encourage us to not spurn our child because it gets unruly, but to find ways to bring some discipline to bear on this young organization, and to give it a chance to develop its peacekeeping capacities.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador Young. We will commence with 5-minute limits, but may go a round or two additional if the members have further questions.

I am intrigued by the formulation that you gave at the close of your statement when you suggested that when the United States carves out a clear and just position on anything that we feel is important, that we have a very good opportunity for serious consideration, if not favorable consideration, by the United Nations.

How ambitious could our aims be? For example, it would seem to me, given the constituency of the United Nations, that if our affirmative positions were institutional, such as the furthering of democratic institutions in countries generally or the furthering of human rights, we would run into some resistance from members who do not share our perceptions in that regard.

On the other hand, your own advocacy has clearly been in those areas. That is why I am intrigued. As you discussed, there is the possibility of seeing the Secretary General weekly or periodically or of seeing the blocs before situations jelled.

How ambitious can our leadership be in these fundamental areas of extending democratic institutions and human rights? What were the objectives that you sought during these conferences or that we might seek hypothetically now? Some are more limited in terms of tactical changes or bilateral relationships.

Ambassador YOUNG. In specific cases I think we can be quite ambitious, and I would say that there is a sense in which the war in Rhodesia, the civil war in Rhodesia which involved all of the nations of Southern Africa, essentially was a classic case, and once we developed a very clear position on that and took it to the United Nations, having worked it out in advance, not only with the African front line states but also our European allies and South Africa, I think the Russians really did not think it would succeed, and they were waiting for it to fail on its face.

They never really believed that the United States would allow free and fair elections to occur in an independent Zimbabwe, or they thought that South Africa would not encourage that. But when we did and it worked, we at least got that one problem identified and we focused the interest and the moral power of the world on one problem.

I would say the same thing was true in Central America with the Panama Canal treaties. Once they realized we were serious about negotiating a treaty with the people of Panama, and that that treaty could be ratified by the Senate, or at least that the President was committed to the ratification of that treaty, it was amazing how much cooperation we got on almost everything during that period and immediately after from almost everybody in Central America.

And when there was some fear since Panama had to vote through a popular referendum on that treaty, there was some anxiety about what Cuba would do, it was the nations, essentially Mexico, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Jamaica that went to Cuba and said, this is something we want, and there was no opposition.

In fact, there was even some veiled support from the Cubans for the popular vote in Panama on the treaty.

I just think that there is no problem anywhere in the world that is easy, but the powers that are potential at the United Nations make it possible to advance almost any human rights cause in some way there.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Just to follow up on your thought about the pervasiveness of political prisoners and psychiatric wards, it is interesting that your predecessor made a slip on three occasions when she said United Nations when she meant to say the Soviet Union, and that you, Ambassador Young, stated United States once when you meant to say United Nations. That is sort of an interesting Freudianism there.

I think both you and your successor as Ambassador and your predecessor at the witness table here made the point of how awk-

ward it was to get a policy in time to influence the other people at the United Nations, so that would indicate that there is some fault here in our policymaking or decisionmaking apparatus.

Do you have any specific suggestions in that regard of how one can reach a decision sooner so that you can make your input into the United Nations more timely?

Ambassador YOUNG. I would hope we would be able to take multilateral diplomacy more seriously. There is no place else in the world where you can talk to the representatives of the whole world in a single day, and it is possible almost in the delegates' lounge in an hour to touch base with virtually every power bloc in the world and get an adequate perception of where we are and what is going on.

I just think that we have to work at it more. There needs to be more contact and communication. I am embarrassed that this is the first occasion where I have met Ambassador Kirkpatrick, but we essentially have been interpreted to each other through the press and felt that we did not have a great deal in common, I think.

And yet I found little that I disagreed with in her testimony, if anything, and that we were perhaps functioning in different kinds of administrations with very different policies, but the political process that gave us both fits was the same, and the understanding of that process, and beginning to work to develop a bipartisan strategy to deal with that multinational process I think is very important for U.S. foreign policy interests.

Senator PELL. I think your point is so valid, too, about the importance of seniority in the presence of diplomats abroad. A good example is Ambassador Dobrynin. He is now doyen of the corps. He has been here, I think, since 1962, and before that was in the Soviet Union.

But at the United Nations itself or in multilateral diplomacy, one of the problems from our end as I see it is that so many of our Foreign Service officers do not consider multilateral diplomacy as rewarding careerwise as bilateral diplomacy. It is almost as if you were in the Navy you would rather be in the line and not be on the staff.

Do you have any thoughts as to how we can hold out to the Foreign Service itself to make the profession of multilateral diplomacy have the same appeal as bilateral diplomacy?

Ambassador YOUNG. I would hope that that would be one of the areas where we could look to some ex-politicians for help. I have a great deal of respect for the Foreign Service, and I think it is one of the most effective branches of any government anywhere in the world.

But in dealing with politics, it is probably a lot more valuable to have been in the Congress or in a State legislature or to have to hassle with the city council. That is the kind of skill that is needed at the United Nations.

So I would say to an administration, look to those young Members of the Congress who on occasion lose elections when you wish they did not. That is probably a very good corps of professional politicians to begin to move into multilateral diplomacy, and into the specialized agencies of an international bureaucracy.

All of us should not have to be lobbyists around Washington or run for mayor.

Senator PELL. Or the other alternative would be to develop a corps of Foreign Service officers who have that same ability.

Ambassador YOUNG. Well, it would be very difficult to do that. I mean, you have to have been in a cloakroom somewhere to know that most of the decisions are going to be made before you get to the floor. There is little in the Foreign Service education and experience which gives you that kind of thing which makes you comfortable with those political skills.

Senator PELL. I agree with you. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Before recognizing Senator Kassebaum, I would like to remark that I was intrigued by your comment that this was the first good meeting you have had with Ambassador Kirkpatrick.

Ambassador YOUNG. The first ever.

The CHAIRMAN. The first ever. And it was right here in the Foreign Relations Committee.

Our hearings, as you perhaps may know, were characterized by a meeting with Richard Perle and Richard Burt earlier on in which they found that they were largely in agreement, too, despite interpretation in the press that their points of view differed.

We are grateful that you met today. As a matter of fact, I am indebted to Senator Pell for his suggestion on behalf of the minority that both you and Ambassador Kirkpatrick appear in the same forum and at the same time.

Now, I would like to recognize Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Young, you certainly have given us some things in your observations on the United Nations that are food for thought. Did I understand you earlier in your comments to say that you would have some reluctance to have the Congress make specific budget recommendations for the independent agencies?

Ambassador YOUNG. Well, it is not that I would be reluctant to have the Congress make specific recommendations. I think I am reluctant to have the Congress try to use the power of the purse to influence decisions.

The reason is, in my experience we have usually lost. On one occasion, I think it was in the ILO [International Labor Organization], we withheld our payment. ILO simply made an interest-free loan from another government, and used that as the occasion to cut back all of the top level American bureaucrats.

And so, when we finally worked out the problems at the top level and started paying our money again, we were actually a lot weaker than we were before, because we had lost some of those key things, you see, because most of these agencies were formed in the 1950's. At that time the only corps of experts available in the world were Americans.

So Americans are very well placed throughout most of the U.N. bureaucracy. They are not in close enough touch with our Government, and sometimes they begin to believe that their international civil servants are without any nationality.

But they are in good positions, and an effective U.N. Administration or Assistant Secretary of State for International Organiza-

tions, I think, would consider them part of the team, just like the Russians or anybody else considers anybody of their national—and the Russians are always Russian. I do not care what they are doing in the United Nations.

Maybe it is nice to have these objective ideals that we are going to be true internationalists, but you have to know where you come from and what you stand for, and you have to be reminded of that from time to time.

I think that the more effective way is to find some method of communication with those bureaucracies through the State Department, and again, with people with political skills, even when we have an Ambassador say at the United Nations, who is getting all of the attention—I mean, right now I do not even know who our Ambassador is to Unesco.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I do not think we have one.

Senator PELL. We only have an observer there. We no longer have an ambassador.

Ambassador YOUNG. Well, that is as complicated a bureaucracy as the United Nations Secretariat is. So it really is a big system.

And my feeling is, we have to find a way to make it work with more aggressive diplomacy and more effective staffing, and that the money resort ought to be when we feel as though there is such abuse that is working totally against all of our interests, then I would say that it would be legitimate cause not to support things that are directly against our interest.

But I think we have so many tools that we ought to try before we get to that point that could be more effective.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I would like to ask you what your thinking is on the peacekeeping role of the United Nations, that if indeed with the Soviet Union's position there would not be much that could be done with the peacekeeping role.

Ambassador Young. I think there is a tremendous amount that can be done with peacekeeping, but again, it cannot be because we want it. I mean, UNIFIL was possible because we had a very good relationship with the Syrian Ambassador and with the Lebanese Ambassador, and they lined up the other blocs, because they decided that it was in their interest to have a U.N. peacekeeping force, in some sense I think because they feared the possibility of a U.S. peacekeeping force.

But we were willing to discuss with them and to try to work out the terms of a peacekeeping force in Lebanon, and they agreed, and once they agreed that it was in their interest, it was their job to lean on the Russians to see that they did not veto.

I never had to ask the Russian Ambassador not to do anything directly.

Senator KASSEBAUM. And then that is what happened? Did they lean on the Soviets?

Ambassador YOUNG. They did, and when it was clear that everybody in the Arab bloc felt that it was in the best interest of the Middle East to have a United Nations peacekeeping force in Lebanon, then it went through, and there are groups of nations that really believe in peacekeeping, and that see their whole standing armies as available for peackeeping functions.

That is true of most of the Scandinavians, but it is also true of little nations like Fiji and Morocco on occasion. I mean, there is a group of nations in the world who recognize that their only possibility for international prestige is to be able to be in a part of a United Nations peacekeeping operation.

It is something that is viewed around the world as a heroic contribution to world peace. So I think that the role of peacekeeping, particularly if there were permanent funding for peacekeeping operations in the hands of the Secretariat. The problem is that we get interested in peacekeeping, and it is in our interest, but we are not that interested in it when we think that somebody else wants it.

I think the peacekeeping has to really be neutral enough so that whether we want it or not, we ought to be put into a position to veto it against world opinion if we really feel it is disastrous to our interests, but there are lots of places where nations start playing games and where they are not really related to the national interests, or not even to the political parties in power necessarily, and where you get in and do not know how to get out.

I would think that a permanent United Nations peacekeeping treasury could put together the appropriate coalition of troops, and I certainly would not rule out Central America. I think it would be possible. It would not be possible if the United States was putting up the money and then wanted to select the troops.

But if the United Nations had the money and then put together a peacekeeping force and brought it to us to approve, then that peacekeeping force would not have the stigma of being the U.S. puppet force. It would be a legitimate U.N. peacekeeping force.

But those are the kinds of things that strengthen the Secretariat, and we have not had a strong U.N. Secretariat since Dag Hammerskold, and that is not because the individuals have not been strong.

It is that Dag Hammerskold exercised the power of the Secretariat so creatively and aggressively that he made both the Russians and the United States mad, and they both decided to weaken the powers of the Secretariat.

Inevitably, no matter who is in contention, we get a least common denominator selection for the Secretariat and strengthening the Secretariat, I think, particularly if we are doing all of these other things, I think would probably be in the U.S. interest.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kassebaum.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to apologize to you, the committee, and the witnesses for arriving a bit late.

Andy, it is wonderful to see you here today. I am very interested in your comments. If this has been asked, I will defer and just listen some more.

A recent question has been raised in this administration about the role of Vernon Walters within the structure of the Security Council. You just mentioned what has happened in a sense within the United Nations itself as a result of the weakening of the Secretariat.

What is happening in terms of the foreign policy agenda, the role of our Ambassador to the United Nations? How critical is it that the U.N. Ambassador be a part of the National Security Council? Is it critical at all? Was it a mistake in the first place to maybe include the U.N. Ambassador, if you might comment, please, just generally on that foreign structure, and setting a foreign policy agenda?

Ambassador YOUNG. Let me say that my experience in the Carter administration and in the National Security Council was that you got a completely different view of things from the United Nations.

U.S. intelligence, I think, is good intelligence, but the truth of it is, we pay for most of it. And so there is always a tendency for people to give you what they think you want.

I was interested in Senator Helms' questions because it is true the United Nations is a hotbed of intelligence-gathering and information, and any U.S. Ambassador ought to keep his ears and eyes open and know what is going on.

And if you want to know how an issue is going to play in the world, and what the international reverberations are going to be on any issue, the U.N. Ambassador has as good a feel for that, because he has firsthand conversations with nationals from the affected area, whereas the President, the Secretary of State, the Director of the CIA is reading a report which comes to him thirdhand.

Any good U.S. Ambassador has a personal relationship with other ambassadors from the regions of the world that are in tension. It does not take you very long to learn who the intelligence operatives are in these other countries. I mean, you can pick them out at a cocktail party, and you know them in the meetings.

I thought I gathered as much good intelligence about Africa from the United Nations as I got through the information that I was reading as the CIA was paying for. It was not that it was inaccurate, but it was different.

Being able to at least express some of the subtleties or some of the world view that comes from an international arena in the presence of the President and the Secretary of State, I think the more of that kind of information you have, the better off you are.

I frankly am excited about Ambassador Walters at the United Nations. We have had almost everything else there and every other kind of career background. It may be that his career background will be quite appropriate to that environment.

Senator DODD. I suspect that he will function pretty well there. He is a highly personable individual. He will probably be on a first name basis with everyone in the matter of a week, knowing how he relates to individuals.

I guess you have thought this out a little bit, but in terms of your relationship with the other ambassadors at the United Nations, and being a member of the National Security Council, is there any chance at all that that relationship is not quite what it would be.

I am speaking now maybe in a negative sense.

Ambassador YOUNG. I think the effective members of the United Nations understand power, and to be able to have access to Wash-

ington. In fact, it is exactly the opposite. If they feel as though you have no access to Washington, you have less influence and stature.

But even with no access to Washington, the U.S. Ambassador is probably the most powerful single person at the United Nations, because after all, the media is our media, and one of the crisis and problems of the U.S. Ambassador in New York is where there are 100 Senators and 400 some Members of the House and an entire bureaucracy for the press to cover, here in New York there is nobody that they consider newsworthy other than the mayor of New York and the U.S. Ambassador, and so you have a lot more news coverage than is probably healthy for anybody.

That also is a considerable amount of power that commands respect throughout the world, really.

Senator DODD. I thank you for that statement, and I join with others here in welcoming you back to a city you know fairly well. We are delighted to have you before us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Dodd.

Senator Pell, do you have additional questions of Ambassador Young?

Senator PELL. Yes. I wonder if I could be permitted one which has not to do with multilateral diplomacy, but with an area which I know Ambassador Young was interested in when he was at the United Nations, and that is the question of South Africa. What are your views on the question or the thought of disinvestment as being a good idea or a bad idea?

I find myself quite torn. We have sent two members of our staff to South Africa in this recess period with instructions to talk to as many South African blacks as we can, to find out the merits of disinvestment. I was interested in your view.

Ambassador YOUNG. I am an advocate of what I call selective investment. I think that tactically is the only thing that will work. I do think there has to be maintained pressure on South Africa, and I think resolutions from the House and Senate do that.

But I think when a mass movement of churches and universities talks about divestment, they really are not talking about anything that they can do. It will never happen. It is unrealistic and therefore irrelevant for the most part.

It is not unrealistic and irrelevant if one particular violator of the sensitivities of human rights and human dignity are in South Africa, one particular American company was identified at a time and a specific campaign mounted against that. I think that would be the way. It would not hurt anybody but it would send the kind of message to South Africa and to the corporate community that something has to be done.

My own view is that South Africa does not have the moral resources to change by themselves, just as I do not think we had the moral resources to change in the South by ourselves. It took the outside pressure of a Supreme Court and a Congress of the United States.

And time after time I would sit with my white counterparts in the midst of the civil rights movement, and we would agree on what had to be done, but he could not agree to it publicly and stay elected, and since it probably required some compromise that

might have gotten me in trouble if I had been the public advocate of it, essentially we had to go to the courts and get them to order us to do what we really wanted to do anyway and what we knew we had to do.

Now, that is the situation in which I see South Africa. Not only is their black politics very complicated, but their white politics is very complicated, and nobody can do anything right and stay in power. So anything done in South Africa is going to have to be forced on them.

I think the choice is not whether we force it, but the choice is whether that force is going to be an intelligent, gradual nonviolent forcing, or whether that choice is going to be doing nothing until there is a complete explosion.

So, I am an advocate of selective divestment, one company at a time, but actually that is all we were able to do in the civil rights movement, too. We could never get everybody to boycott every company, every bread company, for instance.

But if we took one bread company and said, for the next few weeks do not eat this bread, everybody could buy another kind of bread. In the meantime, that particular bread company began to hire blacks, began to buy its flour elsewhere. I mean, it made them morally responsible as a company, and once they became morally responsible, we started buying their bread again.

I think that selective divestment in South Africa is going to be one of the tactics that is going to have to evolve, probably not from the Senate, but from private movements.

Senator PELL. Well, from the viewpoint of domestic—of American policy, I have some question as to whether overall a broadside disinvestment is a good idea. I am interested in your thoughts there.

Ambassador YOUNG. Well, I think it is not possible to implement it. If you could implement it very quickly, and if there were the threat of that kind of sudden disruption, it probably could bring change, but I just do not know that it would happen.

Multinational capitalism is much too tricky, and what we saw in Rhodesia, for instance, was that the American companies that did pull out, and some did, continued to be run by South African subsidiaries in Rhodesia, and it did not do what we had hoped. It did not, for instance, immediately bring down the Rhodesian economy.

In fact, the Rhodesian economy in some ways was stronger after 15 years of sanctions than it was before, but that does not mean that the moral pressure of sanctions and the threat of violence did not make it—that was one of the pressures on us. When we realized that that was not working, that was one of the reasons why the United States took a more aggressive diplomatic initiative to resolving that.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Young, I think your testimony on this issue of the responsiveness of South Africa is really very important. I would like to continue for just a moment in that area, because I suspect that I share Senator Pell's question of tactics, and your idea of one company at a time is an important contribution to try to think about.

What I perceive is that we have heard some testimony, and we will have more on this committee. Next week we will go into more formal hearings on South Africa—many people whom I would describe as leaders in civil rights causes in this country believe a more broadside approach is required.

In other words, they might agree with you essentially—well, I do not want to characterize your viewpoint in advance. But the situation is so complex they might say that whatever we do may have only limited effect, but nevertheless, to be sure that your heart and your mind are on the right side, in one sort of general swoop, you want to make sure that the message gets across.

So therefore you go for total divestment or some serious and broad change, and if the argument is then made that South Africans would run the company, or that French people would come in, or the English or Germans or whoever, that is fair, but at least you have stated your own moral position and you feel good about that, and you have sort of satisfied the situation.

Now, if you do not go that route, and some may go that route, and that may be the majority view, for all I know, some of us have been trying to think through again the Sullivan principles or even modifications of Sullivan principles that would be more helpful with the specific black employees of American firms over whom we might have some control, and to suggest that the Sullivan principles be mandatory, and that maybe they be extended.

And in the event that companies in this country who want to do business with South Africa do not wish to subscribe to those principles, then certain benefits that are forthcoming now from our Government could be withheld, so that in a sense you have a smaller universe of companies, probably a smaller universe of people.

And critics of this would say only 2 percent of blacks in South Africa are in any way attached to American firms, so that it is a minimal number anyway, even though we might encourage more of this.

Would you just think out loud for a moment about that type of strategy as opposed to either divestment or simply the threat of divestment or another strategy, say, 2 years down the trail if principled things did not happen heading toward the end of apartheid you would go a sterner route, so that you would have a sword hanging out there without action?

Would you make a general comment about selective or mandatory Sullivan principles or specific aid to blacks as individuals and employees of American firms?

Ambassador YOUNG. Let me say, Senator, that I think South Africa is so critical and in such bad shape we almost have to start thinking about both and rather than either or. I have always been a supporter of the Sullivan principles, but I have always felt that they were not enough and would not accomplish what needed to be accomplished.

But making them mandatory, there is certainly no harm in that. I think we almost have to raise it from another perspective in terms of with limited capital in the world, where is the safest and most profitable long-term investment by the U.S. business community?

Is it in South Africa or, say, is it in Zimbabwe? I mean, should pension funds be invested in companies that are investing their money in South Africa, or would it be better off buying African Development Bank paper so that some of the technology—I mean, almost every resource you find in South Africa that is being mined or developed exists somewhere else in Africa.

When we decide on an Eximbank loan or when we decide on an IMF [International Monetary Fund] loan, I think we ought to make a choice about the long range. In 1965 or 1970 I would not have advised anybody to invest in Angola. It was obvious that something was going to happen there, and it was not going to be good for a while.

There are some things that I think you have to do. And I think that that is what I sense the Congress is trying to get a sense of. I would hope that the mandatory Sullivan principles, the restrictions on IMF, Eximbank, new investment, I do not think there should be any question about that.

I happen to feel that it is bad to have an arms embargo against South Africa if you had no intention of implementing it, for instance, and whenever you vote for something, you ought to have a plan of implementation. I think where I raise questions about divestment is only on the question of how can it be implemented?

And the best I can see is, one at a time, or certain sectors. This is something that we are going to have to discuss, and we have to make some decisions about whether the investment or the existence of an operation when it is there is a force for good or ill.

It is a very complicated subject, and the more you know about it, the more difficult it gets. But I would hope that that would not be a reason for inaction.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate your comment. The committee did act, perhaps as you read, at the time of our markup on foreign assistance to adopt as a separate piece of legislation a bill offered by Senator Mathias and Senator Cranston that essentially tried to pick up principles that were enunciated by Bishop Tutu during his visit, and a whole set of activities would come into play 2 years from now.

That was a beginning. We are going to try in a formal sense to at least get a sense of this committee.

Ambassador YOUNG. Well, in terms of Krugerrands, for instance, I do not know if there is any reason why we should allow Krugerrands to be sold here, in terms of the kinds of things that will work on South Africa in relationship to specific changes.

And I think the Organization on African Unity has consistently said that their next item of agenda is South Africa's relationship to southwest Africa on Namibia, and I think in relationship to the independence of Namibia, strong sanctions such as an airline embargo which could be implemented, where flight plans are filed with the International Civil Aeronautics Organization, that tactically if there was a vote by the Senate that if there was not agreement between South Africa and the United Nations on an end to the occupation of Namibia by September 1, that such and such a sanction would go into place, I think the sanction would probably never have to be implemented.

But I do not think the South African Government can make a decision to get out of Namibia without some outside force to blame for it.

What I see the debate in the Senate as being is this. I do not see it as really hurting South Africa or really helping South Africa.

In terms of the de facto implementation of the action itself, what it does is, it gives a moral framework of the world opinion in which South African politicians have to then operate so that they do not operate just in the very limited context of minority white politics, which only represents 15 percent of the population in the country.

The presence of any action by the United States broadens their political mandate and gives them power that I think many of them want.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you again very much for coming here today.

Senator Pell, do you have anything further?

Senator PELL. I just have one specific thought in connection with South Africa. I have been turning over in my mind the idea of a sanction being in the form of removing most favored nation treatment for them. It would not involve much in the way of money, but it would be very effective, because it would lump them in effect with totalitarian states such as the Soviet Union and others.

Ambassador YOUNG. Absolutely. I think it is extremely important to send those kinds of signals.

Senator PELL. I think this would be important from the propaganda viewpoint or publicity viewpoint or psychological viewpoint to do, and I would tend to suggest it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you again, Mr. Ambassador.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

○